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A Monetary Analysis of the Administration’s
Budget and Economic Projections
KEITH M. CARLSON
HE administration’s budget proposals and
economic report, presented to Congress and the
nation in early February, have generated consider-
able controversy.1 The prospect of historically large
deficits through 1987 has especially unsettled many
observers. Many question the plausibility of the
administration’s economic forecast, which they
considler too optimistic
Economic forecasts have always been a critical
part of the budget process. One can see, however,
how their importance is magnified in an inflation-
swollen economy. A re-estimate of CNP growth by
only 1 percent, for example, results in a change of
$13 billion in federal budget receipts within two
years•2 In addition, federal expenditures in recent
years have become more sensitive to the pace of
inflation and output, as the number of inflation—
indexed programs and income-security programs,
which automatically changein response to economic
conditions, has increased.
Aside from the budget issue, the administration’s
projections are of general interest because they
reflect the philosophy that guides the administra-
tion’s economic policies. This year’s budget and
economicreport provide the first detailed statement
of the administration’s economic philosophy. One
key difference from the previous administration’s
philosophy is in the interpretation and role ofmone-
tary actions inthedetermination ofeconomic events
act of the United States Gocern incaI for Fisci,! ~ca r 1983
(hereafter referred to as Fiscal 1983 Budget) and the 1982
Economic Report of the President, which also includes the 1982
Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers (hereafter
referred to as CEA Report).
2
See Fiscal 1983 Budget, p. 2:9.
This article analyzes the role ofmonetary actions
in the current achninistration’s economicframework.
The discussion evaluates the consistency of the
administration’s economic projections, given the
structure of the economy and past experience with
lags in the effect of economic policy Tile basis for
this evaluation is a monetary model ofthe US. econ—
oniv developed at the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis.3 The implications of tile analysis also are
applied to tile federal budget outlook.
MONFTABY ~%iV:\jV~~S AND
THI•I. iI:.~.wN (y?fjf~ HF.:PDRT’
The Economic Report of the President and The
Annual Report ofthe Council ofEconomic Advisers
(CEA Report) together provide a concise summary of
the economic philosophy behind the administra-
tion’s decision-making. President Reagan’s report
devotes relatively little space to the subject of
monetary policy, although the president states sup-
port for • • a policy of gradual and less volatile
reduction in the growth oftile money supply. ~This
supportcontrasts with PresidentCarter’s statementa
year earlier •.that public opinion not hold the
Federal Reserve to such a rigid form of monetary
targeting as to deprive it ofthe flexibility it needs to
conduct a responsible monetary pohcy5
The most explicit discussion of the role of mone—
tarv actions in the administration’s economic
framework is in theCEA Report. For example, in the
opening chapter, which summarizes culTent eco-
nomic conditions, the CEA singles out the varying
3
For details of this model, see the appendix.
~1982 Econo,,,ic Report of the President, p 8.
~1981bcon,,ii Ic Report of the Preside,it, p. 13,
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and generallyrestrictive rateofmonetary expansion
as the chief culprit responsible for the economy’s
unsatisMctory performance in the 1979-81 period.
The CEA goes on to say that “continued monetary
restraint and a reduction of the within-year vari-
ability of money growth . .. are necessary both to
reduce inflation and provide the basis for sustained
economic growth.”0
TheCEAReport~s overall theme is thatthe federal
government’s role in economic affairs should be
reduced. Consistentwiththattheme is aprogram to
controlinflation, which, asthe CEAstates forcefully,
is essentially amonetary phenomenon, Thus,”. . a
decrease in money growth is the necessary strategy
to end inflation.”~ In light ofthe important role that
expectations play in the inflationary process, the
CEA is very specific: “Forthe Federal Reserve, this
meanssetting moneygrowth targetsconsistent with
asustained decrease in the rateofinflation andthen
adhering to those targets.”
After establishing these guidelines for an anti-
inflationary monetary policy, the CEA details the
economic prospects for 1982, 1983 and beyond.
Assumptions aboutmoney growth, however, donot
play an explicit role in its economic forecasts. In-
stead, the CEA’s forecasts follow the traditional
“adding-up” approach typical of previous CEA
Reports;that is, the activityofindividual sectors are
forecastand summed toobtain an aggregateforecast.
Oddly enough,the CEA,after emphasizingthecon-
nection between moneygrowth andnominal magni-
tudes like GNP andtheprice level,andrecognizing
the relationship between deviations of money
growth from trendandthe movements ofreal GNP,
slightsthe roleofmoney growth in their projections,
particularly for 1982 and 198r
‘1982 CEA Report, pp. 24-25.
~ibid., p.55.
•iI.ut, pp. 59-60.
‘the CEA attemptsto correct for this oversight. It notes that:
Concerns have been expressed that the Federal Reservestargets
for money growth are not compatible with the vigorous upturn in
economic activity envisioned latein 1982. .. We believe that such
tears, while understandabl, on the basis of recent history and
policies, areunjustified in light ofcurrentpolicies and the Admin.
istratlon’s determinationto carrythem through. (1982 CEA Report,
p. 25.)
This statement contrasts sharply with a statement found else-
where in Its report:
Indeed, changes in the trend dthe growth Se of nominal CNP
over the period 1960 to 1981 are almost entirely attributable to
changes in the trend ofthe growth rateof the money stock(Ml), as
opposedtochanges in the trendofthe growth rateofvelocity(Chart
3-3). (1982 CEA Report, p.63.)
ADMINISTRATION ECONOMIC
PROJECTIONS
Ever since enactment of the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974
(hereafter referred to as the Control Act), the in-
cumbentadministrationhas been requiredeachyear
topresentfive-year projections ofthe federalbudget.
Thus, the current budget and economic reports
cover the period through 1987.
The administration also must setfive-yearnuiner-
ical goals for severalkey economic indicators under
the provisions of the Full Employment and Bal-
anced Growth Act of 1978 (Humphrey-Hawkins).
This actoriginally specifiedthe following goals: an
unemployment rate of 4 percent and a rate of in-
crease in consumerprices of3 percent by 1983, and
an interim goal for federal outlays to equal 21
percent ofGNP by 1981. However, the act allowed
achange in this timetableifdeemednecessary, and,
in January 1980, President Carter extended the
timetables for unemployment to 1985 and for infla-
tion to 1988.
A Revjew ofPrevious Long-Tenu
Projections
Incumbent administrations have been presenting
long-term economicprojections sincethe passage of
the Control Act in 1974. Table 1 summarizes these
projections.1°They represent the efforts of three
different administrations: President Ford’s.in 1975-
77, President Carter’s in 1978-81 and President
Reagan’s in early 1982.
The table indicates that, for each administration,
the one-year forecasts have been quite accurate for
allofthe indicators.11 In fact, the record for GNP is
goodas faras fouryears ahead. Foralltheothermajor
indicators, the forecasts tend to deterioratebeyond








1 yearahead 0.92 1.00 0.97 0.22
Zyearsahead 1.01 1.32 1.72 0.45
Syears ahead 1.14 2.77 2.63 1.16
4 years ahead 0.98 3.72 3,59 1.75
5 years ahead 2.46 4.45 4.88 1.97
6 years ahead 2.16 5.16 5.10 2.22
MAY1902
“the table is limited tothe official reports published in Januasy
or Febnraty ofeach year and thereby excludes revised esti-,
mates when a new administration comes into power and those
contained in the mid-session review ofthe budget
“The root-mean-squared errors for table 1 are as follows:
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Table 1
Administration Economic Projections (percent)
Dat of oreca 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 198 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 19 7
ONP
6arly1975 7.2 128 124 12.0 108 108
198 124 1 2 124 119 109 91
1977 11.0 113 116 105 79 64
1978 10 112 08 105 96 85
979 113 95 101 9.4 79 63
1980 83 107 1 8 129 120 110
1981 114 131 123 18 11.0 10.
1982 81 115 02 97 9 9.0
Actual 80 109 118 12. 120 88 4
Real GNP
Earl 1975 3 48 56 65 6.5 65
1976 6 57 59 65 65 49
1977 52 5 69 55 39 35
198 47 48 4.8 50 4 4.2
1979 33 25 42 47 44 4
1980 06 17 43 50 49 47
1981 09 5 35 37 7 37
198 02 52 50 47 44 4
Actual 11 4 55 4.8 32 02 20
Pricedeflator
Earlyl97S 108 75 65 51 41 40
1976 5.9 62 61 50 42 40
1977 56 59 54 47 38 28
1978 8.1 62 57 52 47 42
1979 77 68 57 45 34 8
1980 89 88 8 7.4 68 61
1981 105 9.3 8 78 7.0 63
1982 7.9 60 50 47 46 45
Actual 93 52 8 7.3 85 ao 92
Unemployment rate
a1y1975 81 79 75 69 62 5.5
1976 77 69 64 5.8 52 49
1977 73 66 57 98 47
1978 63 59 54 50 45 4.1
1979 60 57 49 42 40
1980 70 74 68 59 51 43
981 7.8 75 71 67 63 60
1982 89 79 71 64 58 5
Actu.11 85 e’7 71 61 58 71 76
As of ebrua y 1982
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Chc,t
tnfIat~onand Unemployment
U.5 D,po~t.,.,tof Cam,,,,,,,,d U~S.Dep,rtme,t oF Lobo,
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0
,~
2 Per,,, FoF,’,’t,o, tobo,Fo,,,.
whereby assumptions for the current and next year
are called ‘‘forecasts,’’ hut beyond the next year are
labeled projections consistent with moving grad-
ualIv toward relatively stable prices and maximum
feasible emplovment. ‘‘ For the longer term, these
pro~ecti otis seemingly ignore or senouslv misjudge
some fundamental economic constraints.
TI failure of the (iS. econonlv to achieve relative
price stahilit\ md ‘‘bill employment’’ is obvious
when one compares the prqiection record fhr these
two indicators with actual performance. (For addi-
tional historical perspective, see chart 1.) Since the
start of publishing long—term projections, t’atir ad-
ministration has projected a general decline of both
inflation and unemployment. The actual perfbnn—
imce of the economy, of course, has been Fir different.
Though the rate of inflation declined from 1975 to
1976, it 1ms accelerated on an ~mnual average basis
each year since then. The unemployment rate did
fall from 1975 through 1979, but since then has risen
sharply. Such persistent firecast errors are probably
a reflection ofthe fact that each administration givcs
insufficient weight to the long—term effects of its
economic policies. Accordi rig to the most recent
CEA report, ‘‘The events of the past is years are a
good illustration of the danger of pursui ng economic
policies based on short—run analysis and focused on
immediate problems. Sound policy requires em-
phasis on a time horizon during which the some-
times lengthy, ~md usually unpredictable, lags in
economic processes can work. 12
Table 2 summarizes the Reagan administration’s
economic projections. “he nominal GNP goal fhr
fourth quarter 1987 is $5,248 billion, which would
mean a 9.8 percent average annual rate of increase
from 1981 to 1987. This rate would be distributed as
a 4.4 percent rate ofexp~u1sionin real CNP and a 5.2
percent rate of increase in the GNP deflator. In 1987,
according to these projections, real GNP would be
growing ata 4.3percent rate, the GNP deflator would
he rising at a4.4 percent rate and the unemployment
rate would decline to 5.2 percent h~the fourth
(Inarter.
As a part of its program, the administration has
proposed a budget plan aimed at a year—by—year
reduction in the size of the federal deficit. Federal
outlays are projected to (lee] inc to 19.7 percent of
GNP in fiscal 1987 compared with an estimated 23.5
percent in fiscal 1982. More importantly, however,
the administration announced its support of a mone—
tar~policy that will prodnee con tinned gradual
reductions in the rate of monetary growth.
From the fourth quarter of 1979 to the fourth
(plarter of 1980, Ml (cnrrenc\ pIns checkable de-
posits) grew at a 7.3 percent annual rate. The Adniin-
istration assililles a gradual hut stead~reduction in
the growth of money to one—hall that rate Iw 1986i~
The CEA notes
adjust speedily
regim c’ in order
that inflationary expectations must
to file anti —inflationarv monetary
to attain these economic goals. 14
A \~iONFITARY i\NALYSIS OF
~ ‘~ l~\a tt)\ ‘() L ( r1~)’s~s
In sharp contrast to previous administrations, the
present administration has explicitly spelled out a
target path for monetary growth. It is therefore of
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Table 2
Administration’s Economic Projections 1982-87 (from
fiscal 1983 budget)1
SN/P Real GNP Ml
(bill ons o (billions of Prices Uneniploymen (billions of
dollars) 1972 dollar ) (1972 100) rate dollars)
lV/198 Actual $2995 $1498 200.0 840 $436.7
(91) (08) (8.8) (50)
IV/1982 3307 1543 2144 8.4 4574
(10.4) (30) (72) (4.7)
111/1983 3671 1623 225.2 76 4779
(110) (52) (5.5) (45)
IV 1984 4038 1702 237.2 6.8 498 1
(10.0) (49) (49) (4.2)
lV/1985 4417 1781 2481 62 5 7.8
(9.4) (46) (46) (4.0)
1V11986 4819 1857 2595 5.6 5370
(91) (43) (46) (17)
P1/1987 5248 1937 270.9 5 5555
(89) (4.3) (4.4) (34)
1981-87 (9.8) (44) (52) 66 (41)
NOTE. All GNP data adjusted to February 198 revision of NIA accounts. Ml reflects revision
of February 1982 Ml figures correspond to monetary policy assumption stated in the
1982 CEA Report
tRates of change in parentheses
interest to see how the administration’s projections
comnparewith thosederived from an explicitly mone-
tarist model. The framework used for this compar—
ison isarevised and updated version of the ‘‘St.
Imiii s model .‘‘~
According to the St. Louis model, nominal CNP is
determined directly bvaredueed—form equation
relating the percent change in CNP to current and
past changes in money (Nil) and high—employment
federal expenditures (national income accounts
basis). Estimates of this equation indicate that the
growth of federal spending has little net effect on
CNP oser a period of a ~‘ear or more.16 The primary
factors affecting GNP growth are the rate of change
of money and trend velocity, as embodied in the
coefficients of the equation.
15For a chiselission of tIie original model, 5cc- Leon all C. AiicI erseis
and Kei (Is NI. Carlson, --A NIon etari st NIode I for F conontic
Stabilization.” thi, Hoc/etc April 19701. pp. 7—25. Foradetailecl
si i muian of tue inodeI in reyi sc-cl amid updated forut, see the
appen (lix.
tEiFtlr a recent study of the impactof fiscal actions on CNP, seeR.
NV. Hafer, “The Role ofFiscal Policy in the St. Louis Equatiomi,’’
this Recieic (january 1982), pp. 17—22,
The change its CN P is distrihuteci between
changes in the price level and output i-ia a price
equation. The price equation specifies the percent
change in the GNP deflator as a function of energy
prices, demand pressure and the recent history of
price change.’7 O\’er tile long run, tile estimated
change in the price level is dominated b thetrend of
money growth, Giyen the change in CNP and the
change in the price level, thc- change in ontput is
found yia tile GNP identity; that is, CNP eqttals
price level times output.
The unemploynsent rate also is solved for as apart
ofthe St. Louis model. Estimated changes in output
along with assumptions about the growth ofpoten-
tial output provide the basis for calculating the
unemployment rate via Ohm’s Law.’8
‘‘l,or a further discussion of the role of energy prices iii the
dheteriiiion Li nis of the pricc I ~.sel, sc’c’ jol iii A. Tato in, ~ nc-rev




,krth,tmr NI. Okmmn, “Potential GNP: Its Nteasuremeut pindi Sig~
ml ficanc’c,’~/962 i’t’o ‘cod/upc of’ the Hit sltt 05-5 titd /fIll 11(21it/c
Statistics Scc tioit itf t/ts ittic I IC ((0 StattstiC(ti N5sO( tattoo pp
98-104.
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Table 3
St. Louts ModelProjectionsforl9l6-8l:An Ex PostComparison
Administration Projections as of Mid-1977
ON/P Real ON/P Prices Urierripioymen ate Ml
lS7SActual 115% 60°c 53o 77% No
1977 113 5 59 70 e plicit
1978 119 53 83 63 as urnption
1979 113 50 61 5.7
1980 10.6 5.2 5 1 5
1981 98 49 43 48
1982 86 4 42 45
1975-81 11.0 51 55 61
1977 St. Louis Model Projections with Admimstratwn GNP Path
ON/P Real ON/P Price Urieniployment rate Ml
l976Actual 11500 60% 53° 77 51°/
1977 112 5 57 7 68
1978 121 5.7 61 61 77
1979 111 45 55 57 78
1980 107 29 7 55 68
1981 G7 05 91 65 60
1982 87 08 95 82 51
1975-81 110 8 70 85 70
Actual PerformanceUsing Data as of February 1982
ON/P Re ON/P Pr ces Unemployment ate Ml
l976Actual 109% 54% 52% 775’ 57%
1977 11.6 55 5.8 71 77
1978 124 48 73 61 82
1979 120 32 55 58 78
1980 88 02 90 71 6.
1981 114 20 9.2 76 69
1976-81 112 30 79 69 74
NOTE Admini a ion and SI Low Model pro actions t ken from Novembe 1977 Review
1 o illustrttt thc- piojection perfonntnc of thc St. pttli that w’ is ii edi ill simnul iting tim St. Loni mock I.
1 ouis modk i, table 3 presents in d t p0.5 t surnma of Sincc the tctu ai path of nmonc tam e ptnsion ~
pmog dtlons mack in this Rd ~dw in the fail of 1977.’~ simniias to that assumed in simulating the modlei andl
The mdci tntprojection period atthat timd ii as 19 / 7 that imnplid’it iii the adnnni trations piqiection tim
81 Th admmnistration s UNP projections .,t that gioti th of G\ p iias ford ‘4st xi ith considlc rible
time imnphc dl apath of did ciining groix th in mone~ a accnrac~h~hoth the idnsi iii tiation and the model.
Thene xx dme dliffd rcnec hox cx er bc ti een the
K i tI NI ( ml on ‘ I )miomnmd d ,o m1
for 19 1. NN I om ci ins administr ttion‘S imscl the St. Louis model’ forc casts
No clx m ‘ thi R in u (‘sos en hc m I9i p 2 7 Thc nmajol fom red UN P, the price lex I and th tint mplox mcn
cImlip mm cc s in (lid misoci I im ccl at th it tnnc cud Hid ~di mcmi
dd Sd rmhc c In the app ‘ndmc tic in th ic ttmocmmt of c U i s pm~ iatc partieu I nrlx after 1978. 1n contr ist to the Sdl-
in I (Is idju tin mit Ion cr1 d ,ommc I tmomi inmi tratmon foi ca’,t tild niodd lit O]deted a slou —
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Table 4
St. Louis Model Simulations: 1982-87 (assuming
administration s GNP path)1
ON/P Real ON/P Ml
(bmllio of (billions of Pr ce Unemploymen (b llton 0
dollars) 1972 olla s) (1972 100) rate dollars)
lVfl98l A tual $2995 $1498 2000 84° $4357
(97) (08) 88) (50)
lV,198 3306 158 215.1 88 4712
(104) (27) (75) (79)
lV,1983 3670 1603 2291 81 5070
(11.0) (43) (6.5) (75)
lV1984 4037 662 432 77 5400
00) (37) (52) (6.5)
1V1985 4415 1720 257 75 5729
(94) (35) (57) (51)
1V11986 4819 1787 2702 72 6067
(91) (39) (51) (59)
l’mf/1987 5249 1851 282.8 68 6413
(88) (41) (46) (57)
198187 (98) (37) (59) 77 (66)
iRates of change in parentheses
Th rc suits of this simulation houx ni ntable 4
hould be domnl’siledl ~i ~tlithost in tchIc 2. It should
lit noted fin t that thc p tth ofmoncx c roxi tli re(Innccl
to attain tlic idlmilinisti ation 5 prc~e etc ci CNP path is
uhstantial lx bight r than xx hat tilts xpl i citix state
a de lied. ksstmnn that thi UNP path i ittained
lioxucxci, tht St Louis mode] i muimc alt s that the
ach nnistiations protection an mdc c’cl optim iistie.
The mnodiel indid ates in nneinpl ox nic mit rate of 6.8
percemit in latd 1987 in eont ist to the aclmin is—
tr ition S ~t ojcetc ci 5.2 percent i tte with annual real
gioxx Hi ax c rai~mn r 0.7 Pc lcd-mit Ioxx a for the modc I
simn latiomi. lh c- niode I i~ ml o mom ix ss ins stic on
inflation i 11dbcatirm nn annual ax ra rc i mifl~ nticni n ite
of .5 9 percent instead1 of the admninistration d Sti—
m ited 5.2 pc ret-nt.
Since the mdmn innsti ation xplieitlx supports
mon tarx polmc~of gridlual iccinctioim in tine natc of ___________ monetarx groxx th the nc-snits of tImis scenn io in
‘o lii is-uniptmomi crc- dc i tiP dl to hc cot i t mit i(Ii Hid t I xx hich \Ii gi oxx th is reducccl giadi mill x nid teadil
minl t mtion m xcii thou ‘h thcx (10 not ~i ox d is cihc c tu toa ~. i petcc tntrate mn 1986 arc snmmimn tn Ledi in t WI
in ttc o tls - in mhl smti mtl cm th di N Bc pint om Hi Fmscnl —
19 2 B md ~ct Eon t
1
m dims moo ii pmo pc its 1w m al (,\ ~ ~ ~h. ~. All other is sumnptmon arc the ame is in the
cc 19 7 ( EN Repomt pp 115 17 pies ions simnul ction.
ing in oimtput audi arm acceleration of the price le ye1 in
the latter part ofthe- period, both ofwhich occurredi.
shn.n (r~i. ficm ( :ipg a(11 anmist rn.t
GM? ‘~‘1
The first issue addressed here is the fc-asibihity of
the output arid inflatiomi scenarios. The analysis dioes
not, at tIns point, examnine the question whether
CNP can be attained with the administration tnone—
tary assnmnptions; it focuses exclusively omi its pro—
jeetions of inflation andi oimtpnt growth, given itspath
(hr the growth oIGNP. The assnmnptions used for the
other exogenous variables imi the St. Louis mnodel are
as follows: potential GNP is assimmned to grow 3.3
percent per year from late 1981; groxx-th in high—
employnient fediera] expenditures is projeetedl at 6.3 g/g.’~a,nire him plot LOPS
percent per ‘ear; amidi the change mm the relative price
of enc-rgy is assumed to he zero.2°
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As might he expected, the model shows a growth
rate of nominal GNP munch less than the aciminis—
tration has projected (compare with table 2). The
CEA is aware of this discrepancy, but does riot ex-
plain why the assumed growth of velocity should fir
exceed its historical rates of groxvth (see chart 2).21
For this scenario of a gradual reduction of money
groxvth, the model indicates that the aciministnation’s
inflation goal is easily achiex’eci; in hiet, the simulated
inflation rate fitils well below the administration’s
projected rate after 1983.22 The simnlatecl path for
neal CNP, hoxvever, is considerably different than
the administration has projected. In the early years,
1982—84, the model simulates much slower otmtpnit
groxvth, followed by fluster growth in the later years.
As a result, the simulated unemplovmemit rate is still
at a high 6.9 percent in late 1987 compared with an
administration estimate of5.2 percent.
Finally, a third simulation was rim, based on a
constant 5 percent annual groxvth in money through
1987. The results aneshown in table 6. This steady
money gnoxvth path comes closer toattaining both of
the administration’s inflation and unemployment
goals than either of the simulations summarized in
tables 4 and 5. With steady 5 percent money growth,
inflation averages 3.9 percent per year for the pro-
jection period, and the unemployment rate is
brought to near 6 percent by late 1987.
P5000!j ( awth (111(1 tOO. ;:.ttin 5ffi5
‘‘i’~S s~tJ~,
1
, ? ,t i~
The administration has einphasizeci that it is imn—
portant to establish credibility in economnicpohev in
order to break the back’’ of inflation expecta-
tions. Behind this strategy is the presumption that, if
inflation can be reduced more rapidly than past
relationships xvonld indicate (e.g., fasten than is
embodied in the estimates from St. Louis mociel),
greater output growth would result. This prospect
would produce a brighter outlook for the interim
ears than shown irm the simulations employing
gradual money- reduction (table 5). There is little
likelihood, however, that the nnemployment rate
wonlcl be reciuced to as low as the administration’s
estimate of 5 percent.
2tSee footnote 9.
2iQ vt-n the lotsg rim ni nthe St. Louis oiodcI, the iiiflatidin rate
approximimintes cisc rate ol monetary gnowth. Prion to the
acliicvc-nmcnt oft}m is cciiiilihrittni, however, the St. Loins nioclel
miscillate
Chart 2
Rate of Change of Ml Velocity a
The more fundamental question yet to he an—
swereci is how the adiministl-atioti expects CNP to
grow rapidly if money growth gradually declines,
With the administration making explicit statements
about interest rates failing in future y-ears, appar-
ently the result of dec-lining inflation, velocity
growth might be expected to slow rather than accel-
erate, Furthermore, velocity growth historically has
been remarkably stable over time, an observation
that the CEA itself has emphasized.2~Thus, while
the output—inflation breakdoxvn of GNP in the St.
Louis model may he open to question, thereseems to
he little reason to question its GNP projections.
~l~~~l:iL• i’Fi)EI? Al? IF ~DGF:’T’ OUTLG(
Ig5) )[ /‘ ‘i~f ,r ~i( i,~I ~hi
The acinnnistration’s economic projections are of
interest because they indicate how the nation’
economic wel&re can be expected to change in
coming years. They are also of irmtenest because of







aDamo a,,i’ro.yea,,ama, at,honge.a.isgi,,,’b m,o’i,’ dataDashed ttne~,sptidti,
adm,stnistrat(ae, p~ai,, rs,s. V,tacity a GM? dt,tded by Mm.
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Table 5
St. Louis Model Simulations: 1982-87 (assuming
declining growthrateof money from50percent rate in 1 981~82)1
ON/P Real ON/P Ml
(billions of (bmllmons of Prices Unemployment (billions of
dollars) 1972 dol ars) (1972 100) rate dollars)
IV/1981 Actual $2995 $1498 2000 84% $4367
(97) (08) (8.8) (50)
1Vf1982 32 7 1501 2150 97 4574
(77) (02) (75) (47)
lVfl983 3472 1528 2273 99 4779
(7.6) (18) (57) (4.5)
lV/1984 3727 1581 2358 97 4981
(7 ) (35) (37) (42)
V1985 3989 1659 2407 90 5178
(70) (49) (21) (40)
1Vf1986 4259 1 54 29 80 5370
(68 (5.8) (09) ( 7)
1W1987 4634 1860 2440 69 5554
(65) (60) (04) (34)
198147 (72 (37) ( 4) 8.9 (41)
Rate of change rn pareuthe es
Table 6
St. Louis Model Simulations: 1982-87 (assuming
steady growth rate of money of 5~0 percent)1
ON/P Real ON/P Ml
(billions of (billions of Prices Unemployment (billions of
dollars) 1972 dollars) (1972 tOO) rate do hars)
IV/1981 Actual $2995 $1498 2000 8.4% $4367
(97) (08) (88) (50)
1V1982 3233 1504 150 96 4586
(80) (04) (75) (50)
lV/1983 3495 1537 2275 97 4815
(81) (22) (58) (50)
IV/1984 3779 1580 2366 93 5056
(81) (40) (40) (50)
lVi1985 4085 1683 2430 84 5308
(81) (53) (2.7) (50)
bV/1986 4416 1784 2477 73 5574
(8.1) (60) (20) (50)
lV/1987 4774 1895 2523 61 5853
(81) (62) (18) (50)
1981 87 (8.1) (40) (3.9) 84 (50)
‘Rates of change in parentheses
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Table 7
Alternative Budget Estimates Fiscal 1987 (billions of dollars)
Receipts OutI ys Surplu /Defictt
Admmnistratmon estimates fr m
fiscal 1983 budge 69 6 6979 $ 53
St Louis model simulation using
admmni tration sON/P path 96 1028 —102
St Lows model tmulation assuming
declining growth ate of money 781 925 144
St Louis model simulation assurming
steady 5 per ent growth of money 829 940 111
.At the same timne, federal outlays have hecomne
increas inglv seiis itive to variations in economnie
activity. The usual effect via unemnplovment insur—
ammce continues to operate, bitt, like the revenite sidle,
a given n nemplovmemit rate now involves a greater
amnonnt of dollar expenditures than befoi-e. In adidi—
tion, automnatic ehianges in ontlavs fbr a mitimnhc-r of
weifitre programs occur when the economy slows
clown or speeds up. In fact, approximately 30 percent
of federal omttlavs now are indexed to inflation
Finally, interest payments on the national debt, an
i mnportant cmidogen Otis component of the hiiclget,
reflect hoth the size of the deficit and the level of
interest rates.
In prior years, analyses of the conisec’tiomibetween
the budget and the ecomommsy foensud omm governtnemt ho examine the sensitivity of budget estimates to
revemmmic-s. Ci ‘ems our tax laws, dhfkrent revenue alternative eeomnomic assuinptions, hitdlget eqita-
estimates dlependi on the assitnipti dW5 mnade about tions were addled to the St. Louis model. TIn- growth
c;xp andl stieh related indicators as wages and of receipts was specified as a function ofthe growth
ml nn uid compoi ite piofits The rc I mttonshmp still of nom in ul C \ P its mug thc c I istic its implmc cI in thc
holds, ofc’omtrse, bitt the size oftoday’s economy is so adlmin istration’s budget dloenment.25 The growth of
las-gethat a givemi growth rate ofCNP translates into a outlays was expressed as a function ofthe growth of
mneh different do~ Ian amnotint of federal revenites outpnt anti the rise iii prices, again using the relevamit
than it did just a lew years~~~gc).This relationship elasticities from the hndget document.
hehveen CNP and governmemit revenues is imnpor- Table 7 summarizes the budget results f~rfiscal
tant because public attention seems to hoesis oii the 1987 for all three sim n lations. Only res tilts (hr fiscal
dollar size of the fhdc-ral deficit. -
25
Fiseah 1983 Bttdgct. pp. 2:6—13. The implied elasticities are
‘~5ttc~1m au c-ftc-ct is tint it, tIne St. Lottis mitode!; inettrporatiomt ctl this Iottitd liv comttparlmig the httclgc-t c—fleets of thtree t’commotnic
pnesmmmmtcdl rc-!aticimsshsip l,c--twei-mt thmc- sizc oh the deficit :t,tch tltc- ,sc:enorios. T!tesc— sec-itanicss are higher inflaticimt!ssnttc- growth,
itt of c comtttmttid .,io~ tIm us ottlci mc
1
timnc spcctfx toe p~tc mstt ii hmiic t c_iou lIt lc,s~ cm ntfl iticiti mmmcl ow cm i,mow tlt hmiahmc t unfit
otttptit as a lntieticmn ct! either the dxc- of the deficit ctr the size of tiittt. with all mlternativc-s dcfimtech with rcheretsee itt tbmc
governtmment. Tltc omthy rolc~for federal deficits itt tlmc St. Louis odmtnmmistntmticmts’s haste c’eommomnie pnojc-eticttts { sttttmtn:n1zccl itt
modc-l is thcirpossihle rehatiotishmip to tIne cute of incstmc-y grcmwth. tahle 2).
size of prospective deficits has become am) issue
amnongeconomic’ analysts, presumably because they
d:omisidler it ami indicator of the governments impact
on credit markets and, thus, on long—term ecommomnic
growth.24 However, as is showmm below, the process
of estimnating the deficit isan imprecise exercise.
4ct~.r~j.fl~ arm.d fO~Brrriget
AIthough the effhet of the budget on economic
growth is still an open issue, there i5 lid) question that
(lie budget is sensitive to the pace of economicac—
tivitv. Tliis relationship received added emphasis in
this year’s budge-t document as budget figures
appear to have become more and mmsore sensitive to .. ,
11 ~ ‘ I i I i ‘i
cconomic. conditions
.*ltp,’.flfit.;ii’/i ~
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1987 are given to ease the comparison ofalternative
policy scenarios. Moreover, focusing on 1987 illus-
trates the imprecision thatencompasses any budget
estimates, becauseasmall change in growth rates can
translate intoadifference ofmanybillions ofdollars.
All simulations assume that the basic proposals
contained in the fiscal 1983 budget are enacted.~’
The differences in results reflectonly the impact of
differing economic assumptions.
The first simulation, using the administration’s
GNPpath as shownin table4, yields adeficit of$102
billion; the administration estimates $53 billion.
The estimate for receipts is the same as the admin-
istration’sbecause the growthofnominalGNP isthe
same. Outlays are higherforthis simulationbecause
ofhigher inflation estimates, which push up outlays
for indexed programs, and lower real growth esti-
mates, which boost outlays for unemployment
compensation and other unemployment-related
wel&re programs.
The second simulation, based on a gradual re-
duction ofmoney growth (see table 5),yields amuch
larger deficit in 1987 than the administration pro-
jects. Outlays are less than projected by theadmin-
istration because inflation isslower, butreceipts fall
t
This also assumestheEconomic RecoveryTaxActof1981 is left
intact. The basicproposals themselveshavebeen revised since
February, but details await the outcome of negotiations be-
tween Congress and the administration. The purpose of the
estimates presented here is to Illustrate thebudget impact of
alternative economicassumptions without actuallyattempting
toforecast the size ofthe deficit.
even more sharply because the growth of nominal
GNP is much less rapid. As a result, the deficit is
estimated at $144 billion for 1987 — despite the
incorporation of the administration’s proposals to
reduce government programs in the 1983 budget
The third simulation, based on steady 5 percent
money growth (see table 6), yields a slightly larger
deficit thanthe simulation using theadministration’s
GNP path. However, both outlays and receipts are
lower than in that case.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The administration has presented a controversial
setofeconomicassumptions andbudget projections
for the years through 1987. Some simulations of a
monetarist model, however, demonstrate that the
administration’s projections contain fundamental
inconsistencies.Based onU.S.economicexperience
since 1960,
(1) the administration’s estimates forCNPgrowth are
inconsistent with its stated monetary targets; and
(2) given its GNP growth path, Its estimates ofreal
growth, unemployment and, to a lesser extent, infla-
tion appear too optimistic.
These conclusions also indicate that the admin-
istration’s estimates ofthesize ofthe federaldeficit
are imprecise. Given the administration’s budget
plan, the pattern ofdeclininggrowth inmoney thatit
supports will result in adeficit ofabout $144 billion
in 1987, $93 billion more than is projected in the
fiscal 1983 budget.
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Table 2
In-Sample Estimation: 111960 IV/1980
(absolute value of t-statistic in
parentheses)
(1) V 244 040&1, 039M1 022t~L2 006M
(215) (338) (5.06) (218) (082)
00 t~t4 DOSE5 002E5~—002E,
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002E1 001 E~
(0 52) (0 34)
p2 039 SE 350 DW 202
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A 032 SE 0.33 OW 176 p 094
~ U UF 028(GAP) 014(GAP, )
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The version of the St. Louis model used for the slack vanahie is entered in real rather than nominal
simulations in this article is summarized in table 1, terms; and (3) where relevant, themodels equations
with the coefficients given in table 2. Equations 1, 2 have been corrected for serial correlation problems.
and 4 are estimated with Almon constraints on the
coefficients. Equation 1 is estimated with ordinary
least squares. Three characteristics differentiate this ‘For further discussion, see Keith NI. Carlson and Scott E, Hem,
model from the original version publ ished in 1970: ‘~nAnalysis of a Modified St. Louis Model,” a paper prepared
— .. for the Spoug Conference on Coos paring the Pied set, ye Per—
(1)most iriablc s ire ente mcd in rit of cli sngt form form ‘ncr of NI Ic rca cononi,c Mod, Is it Ni nflin~ton~ oms Cults
rather than first-difference form; (2) the demand in St. Louis (April 20. 1982).
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